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EXTERNALITIES IN ECONOMIES WITH IMPERFECT
INFORMATION AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS*
BRUCE C. GREENWALD AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
This paper presents a simple, general framework for analyzing externalities
in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation. By identifying
the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out, the paper simplifies the
problem of determining when tax interventions are Pareto improving. The ap-
proach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equi-
libria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained Pareto optima.
It can also lead to simple tests, based on readily observable indicators of the
efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection, sig-
naling, moral hazard, incomplete contingent claims markets, and queue rationing
equilibria.
Traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the
distinction between technological externalities, in which the ac-
tion of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit
ofanother, and pecuniary externalities, in which one individual's
or firm's actions affect another only through effects on prices.
While the presence of technological externalities imply, in gen-
eral, that a competitive equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient,
pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of ineffi-
ciency. The fact that prices change has, of course important con-
sequences: there are both distributional and allocational effects.
But, the distribution effects "net" out: gains for example, hy firms
whose prices increase—are precisely offset by losses—e.g., to in-
dividuals who must pay higher prices. And, there are no welfare
losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes
involved are small: if firms are maximizing profits and individuals
are maximizing utility, both facing prices that correctly refiect
opportunity costs, then standard envelope theorem arguments
imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in
allocations (resulting from any small change in prices) are neg-
ligible.
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At the same time, pecuniary externalities have significant
welfare consequences when there are distortions in the economy
(e.g., from monopolies, technological externalities, or distorting
taxes). An important determinant of the optimal tax on one com-
modity is for instance a calculation of its indirect effect on gov-
ernment revenue raised from other taxes.^ It has not, however,
heen widely recognized that the distortions that arise in econo-
mies in which there is imperfect information and incomplete mar-
kets—for practical purposes, all economies—result in there being
real welfare consequences of what would otherwise be viewed as
purely pecuniary effects. As a result, economies in which there
are incomplete markets and imperfect information are not, in
general, constrained Pareto efficient. There exist government in-
terventions (e.g., taxes and subsidies) that can make everyone
better off. Moreover, the distortions that arise from imperfect
information or incomplete markets often look analytically like
externalities of the familiar technological sort, and viewing them
in this way helps identify the welfare consequences of government
interventions.
With these observations in mind, the objective of this paper
is to develop a general methodology both for analyzing the impact
of externalities and for calculating optimal corrective taxes in a
general equilibrium context. The approach developed can be ap-
plied easily not only to conventional technological externalities
but to the more subtle class of externalities associated with im-
perfect information and incomplete markets. We show how, in
many cases, not only can it be demonstrated that there exist
Pareto-improving government interventions, hut also that the
kind of intervention required can be simply related to certain
parameters that, in principle, are observable.
The paper is divided into four parts. The first presents the
model used and develops the general methodology. Section
II applies this methodology to a number of widely discussed wel-
fare problems involving imperfect information and incomplete
markets. Section III discusses some other important applications
and extensions of the analysis. Finally, Section IV is a brief
conclusion.
u u • '^^^ M'^RI^?"?.® of these indirect effects was emphasized, for instance byHarberger 11971] m his classic paper. ^
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I. THE BASIC MODEL AND RESULTS
The agents in the model consist of households, firms, and a
government with the following characteristics.
A. Households
Households maximize a utility function.
where
x'' = (^ 1,^ '') = consumption vector of household h, xi
is consumption of the numeraire good, x''
= {x2, • • •, XN) is consumption of the
N - 1 nonnumeraire goods,
z'' = vector of AT' other variables that affect
the utility of household h (e.g., levels of
pollution, average quality of a good
consumed).
Households maximize u'' subject to a budget constraint of the
form,
xi + q-x'^^I'^ + So'"^  • iT^ .
F
taking q, T/, /'', a'"^ , and z'' as fixed, where
q = a vector of prices of the N - 1 nonnumeraire goods,
iT^  = profits of firm f,
ghf = fractional holding of household h in firm f,
Sna'-^ = 1,
l^ = a. lump sum government transfer to household h,
I - ( / i , . . . , F ) .
We shall also use
E''{q,z'',u'') = the expenditure function of household h that
gives the minimum expenditure necessary to
obtain a level of utility u'', when prices are
q and z'' is the level of "other" variables.
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It is well-known that
S:k{q',z'',u'') = the compensated demand for good k given
z'' and u'' fixed




xHq,I,z'') = {xi{q,I,z''), xHq,I,z'')) = the demand function
(uncompensated) of household h.^ We shall
assume that this function is differentiable.^
B. Firms
Firms maximize the profit function,
iT^  = / + JO • y,
where
y'^ = i/iy) = production vector* of firm /"with y{ and y
defined analogously to JCi and x'',
p = vector of producers' prices for the A^  - 1
nonnumeraire goods.
Firms maximize profits subject to the constraint that,
A - Gf{yf, zf) « 0,
where
Gf = a production function of the usual sort,
2. The household demand function depends on the entire vector of transfers
since both z'' and z\.. .,z'' (which determine IT', . . . ,TT^ and hence household
income) may depend on the consumption choices of other households, in a pure
exchange economy, x!'(q,I^;z^(q,I)) = ac*(o,/). Also for the sake of expositional
simplicity, household factor endowments have been arbitrarily set to zero. This
has no substantive inipact on the analysis.
3. The problem of justifying this kind of differentiability assumption is ex-
amined in detail by Stan-ett [1980], who makes a similar assumption in a slightly
different context. The difficulty here is that the usual convexity assumptions of
preferences and production functions will not guarantee differentiabiUty. The
external effects may create discontinuities. The excess demand" functions used
here include the effect of prices on quantities both directly and indirectly via their
impact on externality-generating activities (i.e., through their impact of / and
z ) which, in turn, affect consumption and production choices.
4. ;yi < 0 represents an input.
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zf = vector of other Nf variables affecting firm f
analogously defined to z*.
The firm's maximum profit function,
^
has the property that
(2) = l,...,N,
where yC here denotes the profit-maximizing level of the produc-
tion variable in question. Finally,
yf{p/) = {yfx(p;if), f{p,zf)) = supply function of firm f
We shall assume that this function, like the demand function, is
differentiable.
C. Government
The government produces nothing, collects taxes, distributes
the proceeds, and receives a net income,
R^t-x- ^I\
H
where the tax t is just the difference hetween consumer and pro-
ducer prices,
t = {q - p),
and
X = 2 ^ ' ' (i.e., the sum of nonnumeraire consumption).
H
D. Equilibrium and Efficiency
An initial equilibrium with no taxes and/' ' = 0 for all h, will
be assumed to exist.^ At this equilibrium, p = q, and^
5. As described so far, the model may not, of course, have an equilibrium
price vector. However, having noted that possibility, it is still worth investigating
the welfare implications of any equilibria that may exist. The case for this is
made fully and compellingly by Starrett [1980]. We shall also ignore the problem
of free goods. Accounting for them would merely complicate the analysis without
altering any basic results.
6. At the most general level,
(3a) 2* = 2''(*\ . . . X * , / • • • / ) •
We must solve simultaneously (3) and (3a) for the endogenous variables {ac*,2*,/,
in terms of the exogenous variables {i/}.
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(3) x{q,I,z) - ^yf(p,z) = 0.
F
A simple test of the Pareto optimaiity of this equilibrium is
to ask whether there exists a set of taxes, subsidies, and lump
sum transfers that would (a) leave household utilities unchanged
and (h) increase government revenues (assumed to he consumed
in the numeraire good). This, in turn, implies that, if the original
equilibrium is Pareto optimal, the problem,
(4) m a x R ^ t x -
subject to
(5) /" + Sa^V
where «'" = competitive equilibrium utility levels, and 2 ,^ zf, -nf,
p, and q are functions of t and I, has a solution att = 0.
This'-js, of course, a necessary but not sufficient condition for
(constrained) Pareto optimaiity. Clearly, if we can find a set of
tax-subsidy interventions that can make everyone better off, the
economy is not Pareto efficient. But there might exist other forms
of intervention, such as quotas, that might generate Pareto im-
provements even when no simple tax-suhsidy scheme could do
so.^  To see when the solution to (4) entails t = 0, note that, along
the constraint of equation (5),
r^k dq „;. dz''
where
-J- = change in lump sum income per unit change in
required to keep the individual at the given level of
utility.
7. At the same time, it might be noted that we ignore any discussion of the
political processes by which the tax-subsidy schemes described below might be
effected. Critics may claim that as a result we have not really shown that a Pareto
improvement is actually possible.
8. All the derivatives of 2 (and p and q) with respect to t should be viewed as
total derivatives, taking into account the associated changes in / i , . . . , / / , (which,
in principle, may affect 2) as well as the direct effect of t.
EXTERNALITIES IN ECONOMIES 235
—7 = —7, an N^ element vector,
dzf^j dzf
E^ = —^ = —^ (with u'' suitably normalized), an
AT'" element vector.
But, dq/dt = IN-1 + rfp/d< (here 7iv_i is an identity matrix). There-
fore, substitution into (5) and rearrangement of terms yields
The left-hand side of (7) is the traditional pecuniary (or redistri-
butive) effect of the tax, while the bracketed term on the right-
hand side is the externality effect. So far, the derivation of equa-
tion (7) involves nothing more than keeping track of the impact
on household /i of a small change in taxes dt, where this impact
includes the effects of any associated equilibrium price changes.
Substitution of equations (1) and (2), summation over all house-
holds, and use of the fact that S^a'''^  = 1 help to simplify the
distributive impact of the initial tax change. Thus,
It may be helpful here to recall how (1) and (2) are derived: an
envelope theorem is used to eliminate the allocative effects of the
tax-induced price changes. This is why no terms appear directly
reflecting these allocative effects. Next, 5" = S F J ^ = x in any mar-
ket equilibrium. Therefore, the distributive effects, i.e., (3c - y)dp/dt,
"net" out. And the total compensating payments that the gov-
ernment must make to satisfy the constraint (5) amount to
Now differentiating the objective function (4) with respect to
t, we obtain
(9) dE^ dl dJ^
^^^ dt ""^ dt ^ fdt-
Substitution from (8) into (9) yields
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where
(12) B' - XE^^
which is the derivative of R along directions in which the com-
pensation constraint is satisfied. This can be used as a measure
of the net change in welfare. The disappearance of the 3c term
here is due to the elimination of one final distributive effect that
is particular to the tax change. The total compensation to house-
holds is offset in part by the increase in tax revenue to the gov-
ernment embodied in the term 3c • dt. The remaining terms in
equation (10) summarize the "pecuniary" effects of the tax change
that cannot be ignored. These depend on existing distortion whether
in the form of taxes (i.e., dx/dt • t) or technological externalities
(i.e., n ' and B%
For the initial equilibrium to be Pareto optimal, dR/dt must
equal zero at ^ = 0, which implies that
(13) ^ = (n' - BO = 0.
at
Thus, Pareto optimality depends on the absence of any z's. that
change with taxes and affect either profits or household utilities.^
The defining characteristics of externalities, which (in tra-
ditional language) are "nonpecuniary" and, therefore, justify some
form of government intervention, is that they enter utility or
profit functions in the form of the 2-variables. The variables in-
volved may, of course, be determined by the market interactions
of agents (e.g., average product qualities, search times, average
levels of unobservable effort or, with incomplete markets, future
prices) and this will be the case in the examples analyzed below.
9. If the economy were Pareto optimal, dRIdt would equal zero, so we need
not concern ourselves with how the government disposes of any excess revenues
J<or the same reason, (14) below characterizes the optimal tax structure for any
rule tor the disposition of net government revenues. (The simplest rule is for the
government to spend all of its excess revenue on the numeraire good, in which
case (3) is always satisfied in equilibrium.)
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Except in the special case (which is unlikely to hold generically)
where 11' and B' exactly cancel each other out, the existence of
these externalities will make the initial equilibrium inefficient
and guarantee the existence of welfare-improving tax measures.
We should review here the important assumptions that un-
derlie our analysis: (a) firms are competitive profit maximizers
and individuals are competitive utility maximizers; this allows
us to use the envelope theorem, to say that there is no welfare
effect from the changes in actions induced by the changes in
prices; (b) demand equals supply (and all profits accrue to indi-
viduals within the economy); this allows us to cancel out the
distributive or transfer effects, the gains from price increases to
sellers (owners of firms who are producers) heing just offset by
the losses to buyers.
E. Optimal Taxes
Equation (10) not only allows us to ascertain whether an
economy is a constrained Pareto optimum, but also provides a
simple set of necessary conditions characterizing the optimal level
of taxes in the presence of externalities. Since dR/dt = 0 is nec-




(14') t= -{W -B
The left-hand side of (14) is the marginal deadweight loss from
the distortion in consumption associated with an increase in the
tax.^° The right-hand side is the gain from reduction in the ex-
ternalities. At the optimum, the marginal gain from the reduction
10. Heuristically, the marginal deadweight loss from an increase in the tax
is just the difference between the increased income that would have to be given
to an individual to keep him at the same level of utility and the extra revenue
received by the government. In the simple case where producers' prices are fixed,
d(.DWL) ^ dE''{q,u) _ dit-x)
dti ~ „ dqt _ dti
dx
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in the externality should just equal the marginal deadweight loss
from the (direct effect of the) tax.
A simple example may help clarify the implications of (14). As-
sume that a tax on alcohol reduces automobile accidents, and that
individuals, in deciding on the level of care, do not fully take into
account the social costs of their actions (e.g., because they are par-
tially insured). Then a tax on alcohol will always be initially bene-
ficial. However, successive tax increases will increase the dead-
weight loss: the marginal value of alcohol consumption to the
individual will exceed (by increasing amounts) the producer cost. The
tax should be increased until the marginal deadweight loss (the
constant rate loss in tax revenue) exactly balances the marginal
benefits of reductions in the accident costs that have not been inter-
nalized by the individual (the accident externalities).^^
II. APPLICATIONS
The remainder of this paper is devoted to applying equation
(13) to a variety of familiar situations, to ascertain conditions
under which a small tax or subsidy will be welfare enhancing.
One of the main virtues of our methodology is the ease with which
it can be applied, in particular, to situations where information
is imperfect and markets incomplete, to show that in such a sit-
uation there virtually always exists a tax subsidy that is Pareto
improving. But before applying our methodology to these some-
what unfamiliar situations, it may be useful to see how it works
in the more familiar context of some pre-existing (assumed to be
fixed tax) distortions.
A. Tax Distortions
For simplicity, we assume that there exists a single tax dis-
tortion, say on commondity 1, generating revenue tiXi, the pro-
ceeds of which are redistributed back to households according to
11. The left-hand side is sometimes referred to as the "constant" rate loss in
tax revenue, where constant rate changes in tax revenue are the changes in
revenue that would have occurred at the existing tax rates.
Two further points about this optimal tax formula in the presence of exter-
nalities are worth inaking. First, because the impacts of <, and^  tj on externality
distortions will not, in general, be equal, the standard equiproportionate reduction
results do not obtain. Second, we have assunied that the government can adjust
the /* lump sum transfers to offset any distributional effects. If it cannot, and we
ask what tax structure maximizes social welfare, then the formulae corresponding
to (14) will employ distributional weights. See Atkinson and Stigiitz [1980].
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a fixed formula; i.e., the hth household gets a share p'' of the tax
revenue from the first commodity. We then take the somewhat
unnatural step in this case of rewriting the tax distortion as a
traditional technological externality, defining
z" =
H
since tax proceed distributions are "externalities" to each house-
hold. Clearly now, the individual's utility (and his demands) are
functions not only of all prices, but also of z*. Directly applying
(13), we obtain
dR
A small tax (subsidy) on any commodity that is a Hicks substitute
(complement) to the first commodity is welfare enhancing.
B. Adverse Selection
The simplest imperfect information case in which the analy-
sis can be applied is to markets with asymmetrically distributed
information and heterogeneous quality.^^ We shall assume that
there is only a single commodity about which purchasers are
uninformed and that there are no other externalities (or other
distortions). Sellers know the quality of what they are selling.
Buyers know only the average quality in the market as a whole.
Buyers will be assumed to draw randomly from the market in
which the commodity in question is offered for sale. We shall
assume, in addition, that buyers are perfectly informed about and
care only about the average quality of what they buy.^^ (Realist-
ically, buyers may also care about the range of possible qualities,
but taking this into account would change the analysis only in
obvious ways and would greatly increase its complexity.)^* The
situation corresponding perhaps most closely to this simple model
12. The basic model for these situations was developed by Akerlof [1970].
13. As Stigiitz [1975a] noted earlier, ignorance (imperfect information) acts
like a tax/subsidy, increasing the wage received by an individual above his mar-
ginal product for low-productivity workers, and decreasing it for high-productivity
workers.
14. This simple model applies equally well to a situation in which buyers
purchase only a limited number of items and care about the individual qualities
of each. In that case ex ante expected utility (the appropriate welfare measure)
will depend on the mean and spread of the distribution of "quality" in the market
pool.
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is a labor market in which firms hire blindly from a pool of workers
of heterogeneous quality.^^
We let 6 denote the quality of each unit of the heterogeneous
commodity, and 9 denote the average quality in the marketplace.
In terms of the model of this paper, the s^ (externality) vectors
will consist of a single element that is equal to 6 (although house-
holds that do not purchase the commodity may have du'^/ds^ = 0).
Similarly, / for all firms will have a single element equal to 6.
Formally,
and
Under these circumstances, equation (13) for a small tax dt be-
comes
Since TT^  increases and E'' decreases with 6, this means that any
intervention which increases average quality in the marketplace
is beneficial. Thus, any small tax that increases the quality of the
heterogeneous commodity is always beneficial.
What is surprising about this result is its simplicity. The fact
that an increase in 9 involves the sale of higher quality inputs
by some households suggests the need for a careful balancing of
the increased cost of these sales by owner households against the
benefits to purchasers. Yet no such calculation is implied by equa-
tion (15). The necessary balancing of the costs and benefits of
selling higher quality items is being done by owner households
15. A question that might arise is whether agents, observing the dependence
of quality on price, will behave in the manner described here. We assume here
(following Akerlof) that the uninformed agents do not act strategically. This as-
sumption seems reasonable, for instances when labor is engaged at a union hall,
in which there are a large number of employers. Then the supply of laborers vvill
essentially be unaffected by any single firm. Hence, a firm will have no incentive
to pay a wage in excess of the market wage, and cannot obtain any workers at a
lower wage. But there are other circumstances in which a single purchaser can
obtain information about the characteristics of the particular good the seller is
tiying to sell by a variety of devices. See, e.g., Stigiitz [1976] and Stigiitz and
Weiss [1981].
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in the process of maximizing utility. This accounts for the simple
form of" the final policy prescription.
A typical example of tax changes leading to changes in av-
erage ability arises where different ability groups have different
labor supply elasticities. If higher ability workers have greater
supply elasticities than do low ability workers, a small propor-
tionate wage subsidy will increase average quality.
Finally, it should be noted that there is, at least in principle,
an observable basis for judging the effectiveness of government
tax policy. Assuming that the average "quality" of labor entering
a particular market can be monitored (short of determining the
"quality" of each individual worker) by, for example, taking a
statistical sample, any policy of "small" taxes that increases this
quality is a beneficial one.
A question that naturally arises at this juncture is whether
the compensations required by (5) can actually be carried out
given the information available to the government. The answer
depends, not unnaturally, on what the government knows and
the extent to which lump sum taxes are available. If the govern-
ment is restricted to commodity taxes and a uniform lump sum
tax and knows the characteristics of each of the M classes of
consumers (but not the class to which any particular individual
belongs) then Pareto-improving commodity taxes will, in general,
exist as long as the number of taxable commodities strictly ex-
ceeds M (i.e., N > M). Let the government restrict itself to tax
changes that keep each class of consumers, except the first, at a
given level of utility. As a rule, this will require M - 1 taxes (one
for each group except the first). Then let the government change
the tax on a further commodity making simultaneous changes in
the M - 1 other taxes to keep the classes of consumers at all their
given levels of utility. If the original equilibrium is not a Pareto
optimum, then, in general, a composite tax change of this kind
will exist that raises revenue.^®
16 In the subsequent analysis we shall ignore these issues. The questions
are however, of central importance: the failure to take account of what infor-
mation is at the disposal of the government provides one of the most telling
criticisms, both of the standard compensation criteria as well as the New Weltare
Economics, which assumed that all lump sum transfers were feasible. The New
New Welfare Economics and the Theory of Pareto Efficient Taxation [Stigiitz,
1982a, 1985] focus explicitly on these issues. The empirical information required
of the government to implement Pareto improvements is, of course, much greater
when compensations must be done through the commodity tax system.
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C. Signaling-Screening
The previous section considered situations where there was
no signal that a seller with a higher quality commodity (a more
productive worker) could use to distinguish himself from lower
quality workers. In many cases, such signals, like education, can
be obtained, but at a cost. Though there has been considerable
work describing the resulting equilibrium (and analyzing the con-
ditions under which an equilibrium exists)^^ the welfare prop-
erties of these equilibria have received surprisingly little atten-
tion. This is perhaps because of the result, noted in Rothschild-
Stiglitz, that the competitive equilibrium, when it exists, has the
property that it maximizes the welfare of the better-off individual,
subject to the self-selection constraint. This suggests, in turn, that
if the government has no more information available to it than
private firms (and thus in redistributing income, must rely on the
same self-selection constraints) it cannot make a Pareto improve-
ment. This conclusion, however, is wrong. Taxes on goods or wages,
which firms and individuals take as given, may change the extent
of signaling, the average quality of those obtaining each signal
and the wages paid to each category of signaling workers. Many
of the resulting transfer and allocation effects will indeed dis-
appear from a calculation of the consequent change in welfare.
However, the average qualities of each signaling group are ex-
ternalities just as average quality is in the adverse selection case.
There remain, therefore, direct effects of any quality changes on
purchasers, and these it can be shown will not in general net out:
signaling market equilibria are essentially never constrained Pareto
efficient.^*
We develop here a simplified version of the signaling model,
in which there is a single signal, which can be purchased at a
cost; those who purchase the signal have mean quality 9i, those
who do not have mean quality, 92.^ ^ Since signals are costly and
17. See Spence [1973J, Kothschild and Stigiitz [1976, and Wilson [1977] among
others.
18. Earlier analyses [Stigiitz, 1975a] showed that there might exist multiple
equilibria, some of which Pareto dominated others. The analysis here, however,
shows that in general, each of the equilibria themselves can be improved upon
with a simple set of taxes.
19. The version of the model presented here is considerably simpler than the
standard formulation, where there are as many different signals (education levels)
as there are types of individuals, and in which therefore there is an entire sequence
of self-selection constraints. It is possible to apply the approach of this paper to
equilibria of this sort. Externalities arise because the actions of one firm or in-
dividual affect the self-selection constraints of others. The essential insights are
conveyed by the formulation presented. See Greenwaid and Stigiitz [1985].
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wages must, therefore, depend positively on signals, we shall as-
sume that 01 > 62. For simplicity, we assume that only firms huy
labor.
From application of equation (13), the net impact of a small
tax dt is
dR
If we assume that firms draw at random from the pools of workers
with and without signals and that each firm hires a large number
of workers, we can rewrite (16) as
dt - f a
Since aiZ/ae is positive (i.e., higher average worker quality leads
to higher profits), it follows immediately that any tax which in-
creases the average quality in both the signaling and nonsignal-
ing pools is beneficial. This would be true of a tax that discouraged
workers who are below the average of those in the signaling pool
but above the average of those in the nonsignaling pools, from
acquiring the signal. Again the simplicity of this result follows
from the fact that the many complicated "pecuniary" transfer
effects and the effects of quality on a firm's hiring decisions can
be ignored. We now make several simplifying assumptions to sign
the right-hand side of (17).
Assume that the value of higher quality to a firm is directly
proportional to the number of workers of a particular type that
it hires; for instance, if the production process is separable, so
total output y(, is the sum of the outputs of each individual;^" i.e..
where n( is the number of workers of type i hired by firm f, and
yoi is the output of a worker of type i (given inputs per worker of
fi). Then
20. The results stated below only require that the marginal etlect of an im-
provement in quality be proportional to the number of workers.
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where n^  is the total number of workers of type i. Thus,
(18)
dt ^ d t l d Q i ] ^ d t l 3 0
If we further assume that the overall average quality^f the labor




Substitution from this expression into (18) yields
dt - L ^ dt J [ aei 362 J dt [ 562 J^^ " '^-
The first term in (19) captures the "sorting" value of the signal.
It is the improvement in quality in the signaling pool (i.e., dQi/dt)
multiplied by the differential value of "quality" for workers from
the signaling compared with the nonsignaling pool. If "quality"
is more important for signaling workers, then this term will be
positive, and therefore a tax that increases the quality of the
signaling pool will tend to be beneficial. If this increase in quality
is achieved by reducing the number of workers who signal (i.e.,
dnjdt < 0), then the second term in (19) will also be positive (since
61 - 02 > 0 and dyo2/dQ2 > 0), and the tax will be unambiguously
beneficial (remember that this applies to the case where overall
average quality is constant).
Furthermore, if there is no "sorting" effect (pure hierarchical
screening) (i.e., Syoi/^ Oi = dyo2/dQ2), then
f = -'f
and a small tax that reduces the amount of signaling is beneficial.
Finally, if the original equilibrium involves no signaling (i.e.,
All = 0), then (20) again applies (with the reservation that dnjdt
now refers to the right-hand derivative at Ui = 0).
D. Moral Hazard
It has long been recognized that the provision of insurance
attenuates incentives for accident avoidance. The insurance com-
pany knows this and takes this into account in designing the
insurance contract that frequently has coinsurance and deduct-
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ibility provisions. There is a tradeoff between the deadweight loss
from the failure (with insurance) to take adequate accident avoid-
ance precautions, and the welfare loss from risk bearing. But
there is a widespread presumption that in competitive markets,
the tradeoff is done in an efficient manner: indeed, the competitive
equilibrium contract is generally described as that contract which
maximizes individuals' expected utility, subject to the insurance
company at least breaking even.^^ Hence, there has been a pre-
sumption that competitive economies, even with moral hazard,
are constrained Pareto efficient. (Clearly, welfare would be higher
if information were costless, so the insurance company could monitor
the actions of the insured, in which case, the provision of the
insurance would be contingent upon the individual taking certain
accident prevention actions. But this is an irrelevant comparison.)
This presumption is, unfortunately, wrong, and our framework
provides an easy way of seeing this. The simplest way of doing
so entails effectively embedding the zero-profit constraint on the
insurance company into the utility function;^^ then the price an
individual pays for insurance depends on the average level of
accident avoidance of those who purchase insurance, which rep-
resents an externality to an individual purchaser. The govern-
ment, by subsidizing complements of accident avoidance activities
and taxing substitutes, encourages accident avoidance, reduces
the externality, and improves welfare.
Assume for simplicity that the universe of insured agents
consists of identical households and that a scalar level of effort
that reduces the expected loss from accidents cannot be observed
by insurers. Let households maximize,^^
subject to the constraint that
q-ix'' - w'') + 7(|JL^e) - I" - '^a'^f-nf « 0,
21. For a discussion of the nature of market equilibrium with moral hazard,
see Pauly [1974], Shavell [1979], and Arnott and Stiglitz [1983].
22. This is not the only way of approaching the prohlem with our framework,
but it provides the results most directly. We could, alternatively, treat purchasers
of insurance as a heterogeneous pool (similar to adverse selection) with an average
quality, which in this instance would be the level of care exercised in avoiding
accidents.
23. Accident losses are subsumed in this function. This formulation assumes
that the individual commits himself to all nonnumeraire expenditures prior to
knowing whether there will be an accident. Our results hold for more general
formulations.
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where i denotes an expectation across states of nature, fx'' is a
vector of insurance payments across states of nature (i.e., ixi, the
first element of \i.'', is the insurance payment made to household
h in state of nature 1), y{\x.'',e) is the premium paid for insurance,
e'" is the level of "care" exercised by household h, and e is the
"average" level of care exercised by all households; i.e..
and w*^ is the individual endowment vector.
With constant returns to scale in the insurance industry and
risk-neutral investors, equilibrium in the insurance industry im-
plies that
This can be substituted into the household budget constraint so
that (the competitive equilibrium is as if) households choose e'',
x'^, and IX'' in order to maximize / [[/*''] subject to the con-
straint,^'*
q-ix'' - w'') + ^i^i'^le) - I'' - J.a'^V^ 0,
F
where the function U* = / [{7''(x'',|x'',e'')] can be treated as a
normal utility function. We derive an expenditure function, as
before.
where, for the moment, we take (JL'' as given and e is our "z"
(externality) variable. Application of equation (13) implies that
the net impact per unit of tax dt is^ ®
dR ^dVi!) ^
dt j^ de df
Since d (||x''|i)/(ii should be negative (more care reduces insurance
payments), any small tax that increases household efforts at ac-
cident avoidance will improve welfare. Moreover, the net social
value of the tax change is just equal to the reduction in the ex-
24. Note that, for each 7, individuals choose to maximize their expected utility;
but they do not take into account the effect of e* on e (which is negligible) and 7.
25. Note that as t changes, the optimal policy (JL*, will change, but by the
envelope theorem, this effect drops out. Also in this formulation, the change in
the maximum expected utility of each household is the partial of the Lagrangian
of the constrained household maximization problem.
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pected level of casualty insurance payments. Again this is an
observable consequence against which the efficiency of a tax in-
tervention can be measured. (It is obvious that in a one-good
economy, commodity taxes cannot be used to effect a Pareto im-
provement; those who have studied insurance markets in isolation
of other markets—taking other prices as fixed—have, not sur-
prisingly, come to the misleading conclusions that competitive
insurance markets ought not to be interfered with as long as a
competitive equilibrium exists; see, for example, Shavell [1979].)^ ®
The principle that emerges from (21) seems intuitive: commodities
like fire extinguishers that decrease the frequency and size of
insured against losses should be subsidized, while those, like al-
cohol, which increase the frequency and size of losses should be
taxed. Arnott and Stiglitz [1986] have provided a general char-
acterization of the set of optimal corrective taxes.
Note finally that because all individuals are identical, it is
much easier to effect a Pareto improvement in this case than in
the signaling and adverse selection models discussed earlier, where
the government may face an informational problem concerning
who should be compensated for any price change.
E. Incomplete Markets
An economy without a full set of Arrow-Debreu contingent
commodity markets is one in which many commodities (securities)
are composites. When changes in demand change market prices,
the nature of the composite product will often change. As a result.
26. If we assume that insurance can be made to depend on the complete vector
of household consumption, equilibrium in a competitive insurance industry will
imply that
where the e in question is now that of households with consumption vector x*,
since these households constitute a separate insurance class. Under these con-
ditions
dt ~ ^ de dt '
where ** is being held constant as taxes change. However, if taxes do not affect
x'', then they will not affect e'' and thus will have no impact on e.
Therefore, where insurance premiums are conditioned on all components x*
which affect e, tax interventions will not be able to improve overall consumer
welfare. (The original competitive equilibrium may still not be Pareto efficient,
but commodity taxes will not help. See Arnott and Stiglitz [1984].) The ultimate
policy question is whether insurance firms can monitor individual household con-
sumption levels or whether it is easier for the government to control overall
consumption levels via taxes. (A similar but slightly more complicated analysis
can be applied to the adverse selection case presented earlier.)
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"quality" variable externalities will exist just as in the adverse
selection case, and although the notion of "quality" is no longer
unambiguous, small tax interventions will almost invariably ex-
ist that can improve an original market allocation. The initial
allocation is not, therefore, a Pareto optimum.
A simple model of the phenomenon involved is one with two
periods. Assume that, in period 2, the state of nature may take
on one of k values. Assume further that there is a single store of
value, denoted good zero, whose relative price in period 2 depends
on the state of nature that materializes at that time.^'' Let an
in + l)^-dimensional vector s = (si, . . . , s*) denote the vector of
price vectors of n period-two nonnumeraire commodities with Sok = 1
for all k, in each of the period 2 states of nature. The value of this
vector will depend upon market conditions in period 2, which
depend, among other things, on taxes and the amount of the good
zero available in period 2. If good zero is the only store of value,
then a household's expected utility at the beginning of period 2
depends on its holdings Wg, of this good at that time and the
vector of prices s. For each W^ and s, there is a function
V''iWo;s) which describes the maximum expected utility of house-
hold h in period 2. For concreteness, V' can be written as
where 6* is the probability that state k materializes. The vector
xf is the consumption that maximizes the utility of household h
during period 2 in state k. It is selected to maximize u^kix) subject
to the constraint that
SA4 « 0,
where x^ is the individual's (second period) net trade vector; for
commodity zero.
while for the remaining commodities,
•"•jk Xj k yYjk,
27. A more conventional approach would be to follow Diamond [19671 and
btightz [1972, 1982b], who assume that the investment good yields a random
return. If there are grounds for government intervention in the more restrictive
model used here (in which the "real" return to the investment goods is fixed at
zero), then there are certainly grounds for government intervention in the more
general model.
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where Wf* is the individual's second-period endowment vector in
state k.
Looking forward from the beginning of period 1, we shall
assume that a household's two-period expected utility is the sum
of its expected utilities in period 1 and period 2 separately. For-
mally,
(22) u"
where W* - Wg denotes consumption in period 1 of the store of
value good, where W" is his total initial endowment of that good.
(We ignore first-period consumption other than of good zero.)
Households choose Wg to maximize two-period utility.
Now consider the impact of a small change in period 2 prices.
It will lead to changes in Wg purchased and, by this means, to
changes in the vector s.^ ^ In equation (22), the vector s enters the
overall utility function directly as a kind of externality. Like the
quality variable in the adverse selection example, it describes the
"composition" of a ticket in a lottery. In this instance, the lottery
is a subsequent value lottery instead of a quality lottery (and the
individual is concerned with more than the mean value). Thus,
changes in the "prices" s have real welfare effects.
Application of equation (13) to this simple model implies that
a small change in taxes dt will have a net impact per unit tax,
dt ''
where X.^  is the marginal utility of income to household h in state
k.^^ Therefore, in general, there will exist taxes that can improve
overall welfare.^" Models that conclude otherwise typically im-
pose conditions under which dSk/dt = 0 for all k or in which the
pattern of prices that occurs across states of nature has no welfare
consequences (e.g., S//XJj(\fc/C/i) = 0 for all k). For example, Dia-
28. In addition, if there were a vector of consumption first period, it would
lead to a readjustment of that vector, the effects of which net out.
29. An increase in Sk reduces utility in the feth state by XkKt To compensate
requires a first-period increase in income of Xk^ilUt
30. It is worth noting that Pareto improvements can sometimes be effected
by levying taxes or subsidies on variables that are not state contingent. (This
may be important if, for instance, it is claimed that the reason that there is not
a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities is the unobservability by third parties,
including the government, of the state.) Such is the case where the level of storage
can be affected by taxes first period (which would arise if we had a vector of
commodities the first period).
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mond [1967] achieves this by having only a single good so that
Sk = I for all k under all circumstances. The conditions involved
are very special ones.^ ^
In general, tax changes induce changes in the distribution of
prices across the states of nature, and this affects the ability of
the limited number of markets that are available to provide their
important risk-transfer-risk-sharing functions. Each individual
trader, however, takes the price distribution as given, and hence,
in making his decisions, ignores these considerations. Our results
thus provide a negative answer to what has become a long line
of research, to find general conditions in which, though there is
not a complete set of markets, the competitive economy is still
constrained Pareto efficient, constrained, that is, by the limita-
tions on the available risk
F. Queue Rationing
When information is imperfect and search (transactions) is
costly, the benefits and costs of entering a market often depend
on variables other than price. For instance, the return to a worker
entering the labor market depends on both the length of time
that he has to search for a job as well as the wage he receives
once he is employed. And the length of time that an individual
has to search depends on the search activities of other individuals.
31. Note that if all individuals are identical, .rj s 0, and the economy is
constrained Pareto efficient (but then the risk markets serve no useful purpose
and no trade occurs on them). Note too that if individuals are risk neutral.
Kk = Ut so S*^ 77J = 2*^ = 0 (by market clearing).
Again, the absence of risk markets causes no problems, since risk markets are
really unnecessary. More general conditions under which risk markets are re-
dundant (and the market equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient) are derived
m Stiglitz [1982bl and Newbery and Stiglitz [1981, 1982]
32. Earlier studies [Stiglitz, 1972; Dreze, 1974; Hart, 1975] showed that with
an incomplete set of markets, there could be multiple equilibria, some of which
Pareto dominated others. The results reported here show that in general every
f?^'5o^^'u'" '* P^'^^io inefficient^that (to use the distinction introduced in Stiglitz
11972]) there are marginal inefficiencies as well as (possibly) structural ineffi-
ciencies. Other studies identifying marginal inefficiencies include Stiglitz [1972
}oQo •,n??^i'i'o^?°"S ^"^ Zeckhauser [1981], and Newbery and Stiglitz [1981,'Luoz, lyoo, iyo4j.
Still other studies, in particular that of Grossman [1977], have attempted to
hnd a definition of constrained Pareto optimaiity such that the economy with
limited risk markets is indeed constrained Pareto efficient. His Social Nash Op-
timality concept entails fixed transfers across individuals in the second period in
ditlerent states. There appears to be no natural market interpretation of this
constraint: the changes in prices induced by tax changes do entail changes in the
relative magnitudes of the transfers.
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Similarly, in product markets, queues (and other nonprice
mechanisms) may often be an integral part of the process of bal-
ancing supply and demand. The length of a queue and associated
waiting costs may again depend on the actions of other firms and
individuals.^^ In both cases, there is an externality. The question
is whether these externalities result in markets being Pareto
inefficient. We now show how these externalities can be analyzed
using the framework of this paper. The example we investigate
involves queue rationing. The reasons for looking at queues are
threefold. First, they have not been investigated as thoroughly
as search equilibria.^* Second, the structure of the models is quite
general. And third, queue rationing equilibria usefully illustrate
the set of circumstances in which competitive equilibria are Par-
eto efficient (in ways that most conventional search models do
not) even when nonprice mechanisms are an important part of
the market-clearing process.
Again, to facilitate the exposition, we shall use a very simple
model. Let there be a single good, subscript 1. The "good" is sup-
plied in N separate markets indexed i = 1, . . . , A^ , in each of
which firms provide a different average waiting time. Consumers
have rational expectations and know the probability distribution
of waiting times for each type firm.^^ For simplicity, we assume
that they are concerned only about the mean waiting time. An
equilibrium set of prices equates supply and demand in each of
these markets (as always, we ignore existence problems). Let
qi = consumer price of the "good" in market i = 1,. . . , AT,
q = iqi,
33. Similar externalities arise when firms must bear some part of the hiring
and training costs of individuals, and individuals' quit rates depend on the actions
of other firms. Still other search externalities that may be analyzed using our
framework are those where the characteristics (quality) of individuals arriving
at a firm are affected by the policies of other firms.
34. An exception is Truman Bewley's unpublished paper, "Equilibrium Theory
with Transactions Costs."
35. Although this specification of "markets" may seem slightly unnatural, it
is used to eliminate two obvious kinds of queuing inefficiency. First, having a
separate price clear each waiting-time-defined market, we eliminate situations
\vhere tinie-on-queue substitutes for higher prices. Second, we eliminate situa-
tions, similar to the adverse selection or moral hazard cases analyzed above where
consumers know the average waiting time (or processing rate) for a group of firms,
but not the characteristics of individual firms. In our model it may be helpful to
think of a firm's commitment to have an actual average waiting time equal to
that of its waiting-time-defined market being enforced by a reputational mech-
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Pi = producer price in market i = 1,. . . , AT,
Ti = average waiting time for consumers in market
i = l,N,...,T = iT,,...,Tr,).
Each of the i markets are assumed to be competitive with both
firms and consumers taking prices as given, and consumers taking
waiting times as given.
Households will be assumed to divide up their purchase flows
among the several markets. Let
x'' = (xi , . . . , XN) = vector of purchases by household h,
X =
Household utility will be assumed to depend on x'' and, also, im-
plicitly on the waiting time associated with x''.^^
Each firm produces output using a single machine charac-
terized by an output rate per unit time y''. Machines break down
in any given market period with a probability (1 - r^, where r^
is a machine's "reliability," and if they do so, we assume that
they produce nothing for the period in question. The cost of a
machine is a firm-specific function c^ir'^,y^) of its output rate and
reliability.
At the beginning of each period, consumers go to a particular
market and select a firm. If the firm's machine is functioning,
they look at the length of the queue and decide whether or not
to wait (knowing the firm's processing rate). If the firm's machine
has broken down, consumers select a new firm, and for simplicity,
we assume that they do so costlessly until they join a queue.
Since firms in market i are committed to provide a waiting
time Ti, their average process rates will have to be adjusted to
meet this requirement, given the average rate of customer ar-
rivals. That rate depends, in turn, on the reliabilities and pro-
cessing rates of the machines of all firms in the ith market, since
firms that have nonfunctioning or slow machines will tend to pass
their customers on to others. The relationship even for this simple
36. For instance,
u* = u''{x'', w - p x'', L - T • x'') = utility function of household h,
where
w = total supply of labor = labor income,
L = nonworker hours.
Waiting times T will be assumed to be rates per units consumed which implies
that there is a standard order quantity.
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model will be a complex one, but, in general, it will take the form,
(23) /
where yi is an Fj-dimensional vector of the processing rates of the
Fi firms in the ith market and ?; is an F,-dimensional vector of
reliabilities.
The average profit of an individual firm can, then, be written
as
which is maximized subject to the constraint of equation (23).
Substitution from (23) into the profit expression yields a reduced-
form profit function that now depends on the externality or z-
variables 3', and ?;. In general, the service rate required to attain
a given mean service time depends on the actions of other firms
in the market.
Notice that in this formulation, since individuals care only
about mean service times, and these are "priced" by the market,
externalities enter only through the profit function. Conse-
quently, application of equation (13) yields
where c^  is the marginal cost of additional processing capacity to
firm /"(note thatp^r' =^  c^  at the maximum profit, since firms must
still meet a service time requirement).^'' Not only can, in general,
a tax-subsidy scheme effect a Pareto improvement, but (24) shows
that the appropriate direction of government policy can readily
be determined by examining the impact of taxes on the service
patterns facing firms and, in particular, on whether average extra
processing capacity produces expected revenue below or in excess
of its marginal cost.
We can also identify the special cases in which the market
is Pareto efficient. Assume that firms could fix the arrival rates
of consumers on their queues. This eliminates the spillover ex-
37. As usual, these are total derivatives. We consider here only small changes;
note that for large changes, some firms may decide to change the market in which
they enter; that is, firms must choose among all possible markets, the one that
maximizes their profits. Though by the envelope theorem, the direct effects of
these changes can be ignored, the discontinuities in the number of machines
serving any particular market (which may result) imply that the relevant func-
tions may not be continuous. We ignore these problems.
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ternalities from the actions of other firms. Then, assuming that
consumers may search costlessly among firms to find a queue to
which they will be admitted (we are not examining search ex-
ternalities here), there are no externalities and the market is
Pareto efficient.^ ®
III. FURTHER EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Beyond the examples discussed in the previous section, the
general approach that we have developed in this paper has a
variety of other applications and easy extensions, providing in-
sights in a variety of phenomena. In this section we briefly outline
some of the more important of these.
A. Self-Selection Constraints
Since the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976], Wilson [1977], and Salop
and Salop [1976] analyses of competitive equilibrium with self-
selection constraints, the self-selection model has been used to
investigate a variety of markets (insurance markets, labor mar-
kets, capital markets). Most of these studies were limited to a
single market, taking all prices as given. The self-selection equi-
librium, when it existed, was characterized as the allocation that
maximized the welfare of the low-risk (high-ability, high-pro-
ductivity) individual subject to the self-selection constraints being
satisfied.^^ The equilibrium thus appeared to be (constrained) Par-
eto efficient. But as long as the self-selection constraints them-
selves can be affected by relative prices,'*° there exist taxes that
can effect a Pareto improvement. Thus, in the education model
if bright individuals use fewer pencils in going to school than do
less bright individuals (they can do the necessary calculations in
their head), then a tax on pencils has a differential effect on low-
and high-ability individuals. Since the self-selection constraints
represent a big wedge in the economy, it is not surprising that
introducing a small wedge (in the pencil market) which reduces
38. Notice how restrictive these assumptions are. As both the search literature
and these examples demonstrate, when nonprice processes play an important role
in balancing supply and demand, the Pareto optimaiity of the "market" outcome
will be unlikely.
39. Also, implicitly, the highest risk (lowest ability) individuals obtain what
they would have obtained were they the only individuals in the market.
40. What is required is that the change in prices affect different types of
individuals differently: there would almost always seem to be some commodity
for which this is true.
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the magnitude of the big wedge (the self-selection constraint) may
be desirable. (Formally, the effects of self-selection constraints
can most easily be analyzed within our model by embedding them
into a "derived" utility function, in a manner analogous to how
we analyzed moral hazard.)
A special application of the self-selection model that has re-
ceived considerable attention recently is that where workers are
uninformed concerning the state of nature; self-selection con-
straints are used to induce firms to tell truthfully the state of
nature. (See Grossman-Hart [1983], Azariadis and Stiglitz [1983],
and Stiglitz [1984] and the papers cited there.) The implicit con-
tract equilibrium, with asymmetric information, is in general,
not Pareto efficient.
B. Moral Hazard and Incentives
The general set of issues discussed in subsection II.D arises
not only in formal insurance markets, but also in a variety of
other contexts in which there is implicit insurance, in which in-
dividuals do not bear the full costs of their actions. One well-
studied example arises in economies with sharecropping [Stiglitz,
1974]. Braverman and Stiglitz [1982] have argued that in this
context, the externalities across markets'*^ may be so large and
important that they are effectively internalized, through the in-
terlinking of land, labor, and product markets. Similar effects
arise in labor contracts in general, and managerial contracts in
particular, when workers are not paid on a strictly piece rate
basis. Moral hazard issues also arise in capital markets where
both effort and risk-taking decisions may be affected [Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981].
C. Unemployment Equilibria
Whenever the terms of a contractual arrangement affect the
productivity of a worker (the riskiness of loan, etc.) either through
selection or incentive effects, then there may exist equilibria that
are not market clearing.*^ The informational problems imply that,
in general, Pareto efficiency may entail unemployment; nonethe-
less, the market equilibrium is not, in general, a constrained
41. These arise from the effect of prices of credit or other commodities on
effort exerted by the tenant; alternatively, the terms of the tenancy contract may
afTect default probabilities.
42. For a survey of these theories see Stiglitz [1985].
256 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Pareto optimum. It should be noted, however, that the approach
developed here does not apply directly to this problem, since we
have assumed here that markets clear (see Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1985]).
D. Rationing Equilibria
Again, it is easy to use our analysis to show that, in general,
if there are distortions in the economy, caused by either com-
modity taxes, imperfect information, or incomplete markets, ra-
tioning may be desirable. Consider the effects, at a given set of
prices, of a ration so large that only one individual (or a few) is
affected adversely by it. The direct loss in welfare is negligible:
at the margin, the individual is just indifferent to buying the last
unit anyway. But the indirect effects, via prices, on the other
distortions may be such as to make the rationing desirable. It
might be argued that the resulting price changes are small and,
thus, their consequences are negligible. However, as Appendix I
demonstrates, this is not the case.
E. Other Government Policies
Rationing is but one example of a government policy, other
than uniform taxes, which may be used to effect Pareto-improving
price and other changes in the presence of distortions. Price effects
must be taken into account in designing other government policies
as well. Thus, the optimal supply of public goods may no longer
be described by the Samuelson condition of the sum of the mar-
ginal rates of substitution equaling the marginal rate of trans-
formation: the effect of a marginal increase in the supply of the
public good on all relative prices must be assessed.
Similarly, if the government has imposed an optimal income
tax, whether differential commodity taxes will effect a Pareto
improvement can be analyzed directly within our framework by
embedding the self-selection constraints into the utility functions,
and analyzing the effect of price changes on the associated implicit
externalities. (Our analysis thus can be used to provide an inter-
pretation ofthe Atkinson-Stiglitz [1976] results, which give con-
ditions under which no differential commodity taxation is desir-
able: see Stiglitz [1982a].)
F. Prices Conveying Information
There have been several recent studies focusing on the role
that prices play in conveying information, say about the state of
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nature. For instance, in the Grossman-Stiglitz model [1976,1980],
as more individuals become informed, the price distribution changes
and becomes more informative. Our analysis can again be used
to show that the competitive equilibrium is not (constrained) Par-
eto efficient: not only do various tax policies affect the ability of
the economy to share risks (as described earlier) but also affect
the information available to each individual, and this too acts
like a z-variable, except in the unusual case where essentially
any set of equilibrium prices is fully informative.
G. Large Welfare Consequences of Small Inefficiencies
Our analysis in Appendix I demonstrates how a small per-
turbation to the economy can have significant general equilibrium
welfare effects, when there are already distortions in the economy.
The perturbations we focused on in the body of the paper were
government induced. But there is nothing in the mathematics
that requires this. Thus, consider the consequences of one firm
not adjusting some control variable in response to a disturbance
to the economy. The welfare loss to the firm of this seemingly
slight irrationality is negligible; however, with existing distor-
tions, the welfare loss to the economy will, in general, not be. (See
Akerlofand Yellen [1984].)
H. Other Multipliers
This example illustrates that there may be "multiplier" ef-
fects in the presence of distortions. The total welfare loss may be
a large multiple ofthe welfare loss to any individual. The analysis
of this paper has focused on welfare effects, partly because the
envelope theorem enables considerable simplification. Our model
can, of course, be directly applied to illustrate other possible mul-
tiplers; any perturbation will not only have a direct effect, but
also the standard indirect effect through prices (which, for stable
systems, usually reduce the magnitude of the direct effect), and
an externality {z-) effect; in a variety of situations the latter may
reinforce, rather than dampen, the direct effect.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude with some general remarks concerning our ap-
proach to the study of externalities. In several of our examples
we were able to relate the appropriate direction of government
policy to some simple, in principle observable, parameters. On
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the other hand, we have considered relatively simple models, in
which there is usually a single distortion (one kind of information
imperfection, one kind of market failure). Though the basic qual-
itative proposition, that markets are not constrained Pareto ef- v
ficient, would obviously remain in a more general formulation,
the simplicity of the policy prescriptions would disappear. Does
this make our analysis of little policy relevance? The same ob-
jection can, of course, be raised against standard optimal tax
theory. (Some critics might say, so much the worse for both.)
Though simple expositions of optimal tax theory often focus on
the case of independent demand curves, in the general case, one
needs to know all the cross elasticities of demand, and these are
seldom available. What is worse, if one abandons the unrealistic
assumption of the standard optimal commodity tax formulation
(e.g., Diamond-Mirrlees [1971], with their assumption of 100 per-
cent pure profits taxes, no restrictions on commodity taxation,
and no (progressive) income tax), then the informational require-
ments on the government are even greater.
We believe, however, that in the case ofthe inefficiencies we
have discussed here, there are some circumstances in which cer-
tain effects may be dominant, allowing the derivation of mean-
ingful policy prescriptions, and there may be other circumstances
in which all that is required is a reduced-form (general equilib-
rium) derivative, which it may be easier to obtain than to derive
the underlying structural parameters. Thus, though there may
be a complicated set of indirect effects from the imposition of a
tax on alcohol, one might suspect that these indirect effects are
outweighed by the direct effects associated with lower accident
rates; and to assess whether taxation of alcohol is desirable, all
that one needs to know is the net effect on accident rates.
It should be emphasized that none of the effects we have
discussed depend on there being a finite number of individuals.
It is sometimes thought that in "large" economies, pecuniary ef-
fects can be ignored, since the action of any individual has a very
small effect on price. Although it is true that in large economies,
the action of an individual has a very small effect on price, the
change in the price affects a large number of individuals. The
total welfare effect is the product ofthe magnitude ofthe change
in the price, times the number of individuals who are affected.
We show in Appendix I that this product does not go to zero as
the size ofthe economy gets larger. Pecuniary effects do not matter
in the standard competitive model simply because there are no
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distortions; if there are distortions—imperfect information, in-
complete markets, etc.—they matter, regardless ofthe size ofthe
economy.
Last, we had considerable difficulty in choosing a title for
this paper. One suggested title was "Externalities in Imperfect
Economies." This had one advantage over the title chosen: as
should be clear from the analysis, our results apply to more than
just the problems raised by imperfect information and incomplete
markets. We rejected it, however, for two reasons. First, referring
to economies with incomplete markets and imperfect information
as "imperfect" seems to be wrong: we do not refer to economies
in which inputs are required to produce outputs as "imperfect";
and the costs of obtaining information and running markets are
no less real costs than other forms of production costs.
Second, the title seems to trivialize our results. It hardly
seems surprising that there exist government interventions which
can effect a Pareto improvement in an economy with externalities,
and other imperfections. Nor should it come as much of a surprise
that imperfect information and incomplete markets cause "prob-
lems." Our results do, however, run counter to much of (at least
the older) folk-wisdom. This suggested that although an economy
with, say, imperfect information would not do so well as one with
perfect information, this was an irrelevant comparison. The rele-
vant comparison had to take these costs of information into ac-
count; when this was done, it was suggested (though not proved)
that the efficiency of the competitive economy would be re-estab-
lished. We hope this paper will have laid to rest this heuristic
argument.
The paper thus casts a new light on the First Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics asserting the Pareto efficiency of
competitive equilibrium. The theorem is an achievement because
it identifies what in retrospect has turned out to be the singular
set of circumstances under which the economy is Pareto efficient.
There is not a complete set of markets; information is imperfect;
the commodities sold in any market are not homogeneous in all
relevant respects; it is costly to ascertain differences among the
items; individuals do not get paid on a piece rate basis; and there
is an element of insurance (implicit or explicit) in almost all
contractual arrangements, in labor, capital, and product markets.
In virtually all markets there are important instances of signaling
and screening. Individuals must search for the commodities that
they wish to purchase, firms must search for the workers who
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they wish to hire, and workers must search for the firm for which
they wish to work. We frequently arrive at a store only to find
that it is out of inventory; or at other times we arrive, to find a
queue waiting to be served. Each of these are "small" instances,
but their cumulative effects may indeed be large.
We have constructed a general model which shows that in
all of these circumstances, Pareto improvements can be effected
through government policies, such as commodity taxes. Our
methodology not only identifies the presence of inefficiencies,
but also enables us to identify both the appropriate direction
of policy intervention and observable measures of their success-
ful application.
APPENDIX I
In order to investigate the nature of pecuniary externalities
in the traditional sense, the natural starting point is to examine




= - q • rfyO = shift in demand for the numeraire good,
= {N - I) vector of shifts in demand for the AT - 1
nonnumeraire goods.
The shift dvo may be ascribed either to a shift in the demand of
a single household or to entry of a new household. An analogous
shift with dvi = -p • dv° could be defined and ascribed to a change
in behavior by the universe of firms.
If taxes are unchanged, the resulting change in market prices
is
dp = dq = J-i
where
[ dx dvi-j^ - -r- J> = 2,. . . ,iV ^dpk dqk\ Jacobian** of the
vector of nonnumeraire excess demands.
43. Only balanced budget shifts make sense if we are considering changes in
equilibrium allocations. An unbalanced shift in excess demand would preclude
the existence of a new equilibrium.
44. Since dp* = dqk in tbe present instance, it makes sense to talk about this
"Jacobian" without treating the p and q vectors separately.
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We assume that the excess demand functions are differentiable
and that J is nonsingular at the initial equilibrium.
The change in income necessary to maintain the utility level
of household h in the face of a change in price dp = dq is
Summation over all households and recognition that i;^ = y^,
E^ = x*, IHO''^ = 1, and Ipy^ = IHX'' yields a total net change in
government income compensation.
dp dq) t^  \dp dq)
The total change in the government surplus (once these compen-
sations are paid) is
= r y.E4 +
dp dp H \dp dq
At an initial tax level of zero this becomes
dp ~ ii '\dp ' dq) Y \dp dq)-
As a function of the initial change in excess demand, the net
change in the government surplus*^ is




45. The expression in equation (A-1) below ignores the externalities generated
by changes in consumption that result from compensating government income
transfers. This is not done because the cbanges in question are negligible; they
are not negligible. Ratber it is done to avoid keeping track of transfer-related
externalities that add greatly to the notational burden without affecting the basic
substance of the analysis. For rigor we could assume that; (1) consumption and
production of the numeraire good^  generates no externalities and (2) households
are constrained to consume their compensating allotments of the numeraire good.
Also we assume that tbe original shift affects no z-variables. Alternatively, the
derivatives can be interpreted in the manner suggested in footnote 8.
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This represents the net social impact of the initial change in price
and, thus, the "pecuniary" externality*^ associated witli original
change in demand d "e i  e a  d v .
It only remains to be shown that dR/dv° does not vanish as
the number of households becomes large. To do this, let
Tim = fraction of households of type m = 1,. . . ,M
(i.e., -^^H = number of households of type m)
•r]e = number of firms of type / = 1, . . . , L per household
(i.e., T]eH = number of firms of type I)
Since dz^/dp and dz^/dq ought not to be influenced by the number
where
^""^"''Kdp • dp/'
iTz = TTJ for firms of tj^je I,
dz'_dzf dz' dzf „ _^ ,
3 - = -J-, 3 - = 3 - for firms of type I.dp dp dq dq ^^
The matrix fl^ will not change with the number of households H.
Similarly,
B'' = H- B'',
where
and fi^ should be invariant to changes in H.
46, This effect differs from the tax effects of the body of the paper in that the
dz/dp, dzldq terms differ from the dzldt terms. However, in both cases, externalities
will not matter either when irC and £J are zero for all households and firms or
when the z'& are not affected by changes in market prices (other cases are for-
tuitous). If dz'Idt and dz''ldt are nonzero, then as a rule (dJidp + dz^ldq) and
{dzydp + dz''/dq) will be nonzero. Thus (again in general), the conditions under
which taxes can lead to Pareto-improving allocations are precisely circumstances
under which "pecuniary" externalities do not net out,
47, Clearly in sonie cases through crowding or other effects increases in the
numbers of agents will themselves intensify the impact of a price change on
particular externalities. Equally clearly we want to focus on cases where this does
not happen. For instance, if z is the quality of air that is affected by the total
level of consumption of some commodities, then replicating households but divid-
ing the size of each household proportionately will, with homothetic preferences,
lead to the appropriate limit for our purposes.
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On the other hand, the Jacobian of the excess demands
d = I -; ~7~ I = I 2^~ z^'T'
ij dpj
where
which should be invariant to changes in H. The inverse of the
Jacobian, t7~\ can now be written as
J-i = \IHJ-\
which does go to zero as H increases. This reflects the fact that
as the number of agents increases, the impact on prices of any
single agent goes to zero.
However,
1
^ = (n^ - Bn • J-' = mil'' - Bn-
dv°
which is invariant to the number of households. Thus, "pecuniary"
externalities vanish in atomistic economies only when tV and
B^ are zero, which occurs, in turn, only in the absence of non-
pecuniary externalities.
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